

IMMANUEL KANT

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*Anthropology, History, and  
Education*

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Review of J. G. Herder's *Ideas*  
*for the philosophy of the*  
*history of humanity*

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TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) was Kant's student in Königsberg between 1762 and 1765, but he had also come under the influence of Kant's eccentric friend Johann Georg Hamann (1730–88), whose views on reason, religion and society were deeply opposed to Kant's Enlightenment principles. During the 1770s, Herder rose to prominence as a critic of the Enlightenment, and in 1784 he produced the first volume of his greatest work, *Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity*. Kant was invited to review the work by Christian Gottfried Schütz, editor of the *Allgemeine Litteraturzeitung* (published in Jena and Leipzig).

The first of Kant's reviews, presented here under the heading 'I.', appeared in January, 1785. It quotes extensively from Herder (though the quotations are often mere paraphrases, and do not even always accurately reflect what Herder said). Kant's chief criticisms of Herder in this first review are directed at Herder's attempt to derive all human characteristics from the upright posture of the human body and at Herder's attempt to argue for the spirituality and consequent immortality of the human soul using analogies of nature. Kant plainly admired Herder's wide learning and fertile imagination, but the tone of his reviews is condescending, since he plainly regarded the ideas of his former student as lacking in philosophical rigor, and as permitting poetic imaginings to substitute for clearheaded thinking at crucial points.

Herder reacted very negatively to this first review. He clearly perceived the condescending tone, resented being lectured at by his former teacher toward the end as if he were still a schoolboy, and thought Kant had utterly misunderstood the aims and meaning of his discussion, which were not – in Herder's view – metaphysical in the way that Kant interpreted them as being. This review would seem to have destroyed whatever was left of the friendship between the two men. This reaction explains Herder's late polemics against Kant in his *Metacritique of the Critique of Pure Reason* (1799) and *Kalligone* (1800) – which was an extended polemic against Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. But it

leaves quite unexplained the glowing and eloquent tribute Herder paid his former teacher in *Letters on the Advancement of Humanity* (1793–7) – a passage that Lewis White Beck quoted at the end of the “Sketch of Kant’s Life and Works” in all his Library of Liberal Arts translations of Kant’s writings. Clearly the relationship between Kant and Herder – both men having strong personalities and independent intellects of the first order – was more complex than can be captured by the simple choice between “friendly” and “unfriendly”.

This review, like all of the Herder reviews, was published anonymously, though from the start no one was in any doubt about the identity of the reviewer. Only a month after its appearance, there was a reply to it in the *Teutscher Merkur* by Karl Leonhard Reinhold, who, ironically, was within two years to become Kant’s most influential defender through his *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy*, which appeared in the *Teutscher Merkur* beginning in 1786. Kant’s brief rejoinder to Reinhold was published in the *Allgemeine Litteraturzeitung* in March, 1785, and is presented here under the heading ‘II.’

The second volume of Herder’s *Ideas* appeared in the middle of 1785 and Kant once again reviewed it in the November issue of the *Allgemeine Litteraturzeitung* (here under the heading ‘III.’). After a more sketchy summary than before, Kant’s review goes into matters of more philosophical substance, chiefly with the intent of replying to Herder’s criticisms of two important theses from Kant’s *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (1784, contained in the present volume). This review, unlike the first one, does deal with issues that both philosophers regarded as central to the disagreements between them. In the second volume of the *Ideas*, Herder objected first to Kant’s assertion that “the human being is an animal who needs a master”, regarding it as excessively pessimistic, misanthropic, and politically dangerous. Kant defends the thesis as only realistic and, when properly understood, as politically harmless or even salutary. Second, Herder objected to Kant’s proposition that nature’s purposes in human history lie not in the happiness of individual human beings but in the development of the capacities of the human species, to which the happiness of individuals is to a great extent sacrificed. Herder sees in this proposition an example of the Enlightenment’s privileging of modern European states over past ages and less developed cultures, and also an implicit accusation against divine providence, which in Kant’s philosophy is allegedly seen as putting the abstraction of the species ahead of real human beings and of using human individuals as mere means to its ends. Kant replies to these charges by defending his thesis that nature’s purpose lies in developing the capacities of the species. His idea is that it is not human happiness but the worth of human nature, as found in the development of its capacities through reason, that is the purpose of nature (and of providence). So this and not

human happiness must be the true ground of whatever meaning we may find in history.

In 1787 Kant was invited by Schütz to review the third volume of Herder's *Ideas*, but this time he declined, saying that he was too busy working on his "critique of taste" (his working title for what was published in 1790 as the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*). He asked his colleague C. F. Kraus (the leading German exponent of Adam Smith's theory of political economy) to review this third volume, with the plain intent that the tone of the review should be as critical of Herder and as defensive of Kant as the review of the second volume. When Kraus refused, his friendship with Kant also came to an end.

Kant's concern with Herder's challenge to his views clearly did not end with these reviews. The *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* (1786, contained in the present volume), though it never mentions Herder by name, was obviously intended as a satire on Book 10 of the *Ideas*, as well as a continuing reply to him on the points mentioned above. And the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* itself, with its focus on such themes, central to Herder's thought, as the role of beauty, feeling and art in human life and the proper use of teleological reasoning in biology and in a moral-religious conception of the human condition, should be seen as Kant's attempt to determine for himself how these themes were to be handled and where he had to reject Herder's approach as excessively enthusiastic and uncritical.

Kant's review of the first volume of Herder's *Ideas* appeared in the *Allgemeine Litteraturzeitung* of 1785 in issue No. 4 (January 6), pp. 17a–20b and Supplement to No. 4, vol. 1, pp. 21a–22b. Kant's reply to Reinhold appeared in the *Allgemeine Litteraturzeitung* of 1785 in the Supplement for March, vol. 1, last page. Kant's review of the second volume of Herder's *Ideas* was published in the *Allgemeine Litteraturzeitung* of 1785 in issue No. 271 (15 November), vol. iv, pp. 153a–156b. The translation of *Recensionen von J. G. Herders Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* is based on the presentation of the work in AA 8: 43–66 and was undertaken by Allen W. Wood. The counting of the two reviews of Herder and the rejoinder to Reinhold as three numbered parts is not original with Kant but follows the Academy edition.

Review of J. G. Herder's *Ideas*  
*for the philosophy of the*  
*history of humanity*  
 Parts 1 and 2

*Ideas for the Philosophy of History of Humanity.*<sup>a</sup> By Johann Gottfried Herder. *Quem te Deus esse iussit et humana qua parte locatus es in re discere.*<sup>b</sup> First Part. 318 pp. Riga and Leipzig: Hartknoch, 1784.<sup>1</sup>

The spirit of our ingenious<sup>c</sup> and eloquent author shows in this writing his already recognized peculiarity.<sup>d</sup> Thus it could be judged by the common standard just as little as many others that have flowed from his pen. It is as if his genius did not merely assemble the ideas from the broad field of the sciences and arts so as to increase them with other ideas that can be communicated, but also as if he transformed them in accordance with (to borrow an expression from him) a certain law of *assimilation* in his own manner and into his specific mode of thought, through which they become noticeably different from those by which other souls are nourished and grow (p. 292)<sup>2</sup> and less capable of communication. Hence what to him is called “philosophy of the history of humanity”<sup>e</sup> might well be something quite other than that which one usually understands by this name: not perhaps a logical precision in the determination of concepts or a careful distinction and proof of principles, but a glance not dwelling long but much more comprehensive, a sagacity adept in the discovery of analogies and a power of imagination bold in the use of them, combined with the skill in captivating its object, always held at an obscure distance, through feelings and sensations, which allow more to be surmised about them as the effects of a great content of thoughts, or as hints pregnant with meaning, than cold judgment would ever encounter in

<sup>a</sup> *Menschheit*; this is the word that would most often be translated “humanity” in Kant’s writings, and for which no footnote would normally be needed. But Herder’s frequent use of the term *Humanität* requires us, in translating the following reviews, to use “humanity” for it, without footnote, and to footnote instead occurrences of *Menschheit*.

<sup>b</sup> “Learn what God has commanded you to be and where you are to be located among things,” Persius *Satires* 3.11.12. This is the motto of Herder’s book.

<sup>c</sup> *sinnreichen*.

<sup>d</sup> *Eigentümlichkeit*.

<sup>e</sup> *Menschheit*.



them outright. Since nevertheless freedom in thinking (which is encountered here in great measure), exercised by a fruitful mind, always affords matter for thinking, we will seek, as far as we may succeed in extracting from his ideas the most important and characteristic of them, and presenting them in his own expressions, but finally adding a few remarks about the whole.

Our author starts with broadening his prospect, in order to indicate to the human being his place among the other inhabitants of planets in our solar system, and, from the middle, not disadvantageous situation of the cosmic body he inhabits, infers a merely “mediocre earthly understanding and a yet even more ambiguous human virtue with which we have to reckon here, which, however – since our thoughts and powers have obviously germinated only from the organization of our earth and strive to alter and transform until they reach as much purity and refinement as our creation can offer, and since, if analogy may be our guide, it would not be otherwise on other stars – it may be conjectured that the human being may have one goal in common with the inhabitants of the latter, not only to enter upon an itinerary of more than one star, but perhaps finally even to attain to having dealings with all the creatures of the many and varied sister-worlds that have come to maturity.”<sup>3</sup> From there he goes on to consider the revolutions which preceded the generation of human beings. “Before our air, our water, our earth could be produced, there were necessarily many sorts of stamens,<sup>a</sup> dissolving and precipitating one another; and the manifold species of the earth, of minerals, crystallization, even the organic formation in mussels, plants, animals, and lastly in human beings – how many dissolutions and revolutions of the one into the other did they not presuppose? He, the son of all elements and all beings, their most selected sum total and as it were the blossom of earthly creation, could be nothing else than the last and favorite child of nature, whose formation<sup>b</sup> and reception must have been preceded by many developments and revolutions.”<sup>4</sup>

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In the spherical shape of the earth he finds an object of astonishment at the unity it occasions along with all thinkable manifoldness. “Who, having taken this figure to heart, would have gone on to convert people to a literal faith in philosophy and religion, or, with gloomy but holy zeal, to murder for it?”<sup>5</sup> Likewise, the angle of the ecliptic occasions consideration of the human vocation: “Under our sun’s oblique path, all the doing of human beings is an annual period.”<sup>6</sup> The nearer acquaintance with the atmosphere, and even the influence of the heavenly bodies on it, once it is better known, appears to him to promise a great influence on the history of humanity.<sup>c</sup> In the section on the division of land and

<sup>a</sup> *Stamina*.

<sup>b</sup> *Bildung*.

<sup>c</sup> *Menschheit*.

8: 47 sea, the structure of the earth is adduced as the ground of explanation for the difference in the histories of nations.<sup>a</sup> “Asia is as connected in its mores and customs as a ground is in one extended land-mass: the small Red Sea already separates the mores, the small Persian Gulf even more so; but it is not without ground that the many lakes, mountains and rivers of America and the firm land have such a great extent in the temperate zone, and the structure of the old continent, as the first abode of human beings, is by nature’s intention set up differently from that of the new world.”<sup>77</sup> The second book concerns the organizations on the earth and begins with the granite on which worked light, warmth and an unrefined air and water, and perhaps transforming silica into lime, in which the first living things of the sea, the crustacea, were formed.<sup>b</sup> Next vegetation took its beginning. – Comparison of the formation<sup>c</sup> of the human being with that of the plants and of the sexual love of the former with the flowering of the latter. Utility of the plant realm in regard to the human being. The animal realm. Alteration of the animals and of the human being in accordance with the climates. Those of the old world are imperfect. “The classes of creatures expand the more they distance themselves from human beings, and the nearer they are to him, the fewer they become. – In all there is a chief form, a similar bone structure. – These transitions make it not improbable that in sea-creatures, plants, and perhaps even in beings *called ‘dead’* there may rule one and the same predisposition to organization, only in an infinitely more crude and confused manner. In the glance of the eternal being who sees all in one connection, perhaps the shape of the ice crystal, as it generates itself, and the snowflake into which it forms<sup>d</sup> itself, still has an analogous relation with the formation<sup>e</sup> of the embryo in the mother’s womb. – The human being is a middle creature among the animals, that is, the most expanded form in which *all the traits of all the species* around him are collected into their most refined sum total. – From air and water I see as it were the animals coming from heights and depths to human beings and step by step they approach his shape.”<sup>8</sup> This book concludes: “Rejoice in your estate, o human being, and study yourself, noble middle creature, in everything that lives around you!”<sup>9</sup>

8: 48 The third book compares the structure of the plants and animals with the organization of human beings. We cannot follow him here, where he utilizes the observations<sup>f</sup> of the naturalists for his own aim; only a few results: “Through such and such organs the creature generates a living stimulus from the dead life of the plants, and from the sum of this,

<sup>a</sup> *Völkergeschichte.*

<sup>b</sup> *bildeten.*

<sup>c</sup> *Ausbildung.*

<sup>d</sup> *bildet.*

<sup>e</sup> *Bildung.*

<sup>f</sup> *Betrachtungen.*

filtered through fine channels, the medium of sensation. The result of the stimuli becomes *drive*, the result of the sensation, *thought*; an eternal progression of organic creation, *which is placed in every living creature.*"<sup>10</sup> The author does not reckon with germs here but rather with an organic force, in plants as much as animals. He says: "Just as the plant itself is organic life, so the polyp is also organic life. There are therefore many organic forces, those of vegetation, of the muscular stimuli, of sensation. The more and finer the nerves, the larger the brain, the more the species has understanding. The *animal soul* is the sum of all the effective forces in one organization," and the instinct is not a particular force of nature, but the direction that nature gave all those forces through their temperature.<sup>a</sup> The more that the one organic principle<sup>b</sup> of nature that we call now *formative*<sup>c</sup> (in the rock), now *growing*<sup>d</sup> (in the plant), now *sensitive*, now *artificially constructive*, and which is fundamentally only one and the same organic force, is distributed into more instruments and different members, the more it has in them a world of its own – the more instinct disappears, and there begins a free use of its own senses and members (as, e.g., with the human being). Finally the author gets to the essential natural difference of the human being. "The erect gait of the human being is *alone* natural to him, indeed, it is the organization for the entire calling of his species, and his distinguishing character."<sup>11</sup>

It was not the case that because he was destined for reason, the erect posture was given to him for the use of his limbs in accordance with reason; rather he obtained reason through the erect posture, as the natural effect of the very same arrangement which was needed merely for letting him walk upright. "Let us with thankful glance pause to admire this holy work of art, the beneficence through which our kind became humankind, because we see what new organization of forces begins in the erect shape of humanity,<sup>e</sup> and how through it alone the human being became a human being!"<sup>12</sup>

In the fourth book, the author carries out this point even further: "What is lacking to that humanlike creature (the ape) that it did not become a human being"<sup>13</sup> and through what did the latter become it? Through the forming of the head for an *erect shape*, through inner and outer organization toward a perpendicular center of gravity; – the ape had all the parts of the brain that the human being has; but he has them, in accordance with the shape of his skull, in only a pressed back position, and he had the latter because his head was formed under a different angle and was not made for an erect gait. Right away all organic forces worked

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<sup>a</sup> *Temperatur.*

<sup>b</sup> *Principium.*

<sup>c</sup> *bildend.*

<sup>d</sup> *treibend.*

<sup>e</sup> *Menschheit.*

differently: “Look, therefore, to the heavens, O human being, and rejoice with shudders at your immeasurable privilege which the creator of the world attached to such a simple principle,<sup>a</sup> your erect shape. – Elevated above the earth and plants, it is no longer smell that dominates, but rather the eye. – With the upright gait the human being became a creature of art, he obtained free and artificial hands, – only in the erect gait is true human language to be found. – Theoretically and practically, reason is nothing but what is *perceived*,<sup>b</sup> a learned proportion and direction of ideas and forces, to which the human being has been formed<sup>c</sup> in accordance with his organization and way of life.”<sup>14</sup> And now freedom: “The human being is the first of creation to be set free, he stands erect.”<sup>15</sup> Shame: “It must soon develop with an erect shape.”<sup>16</sup> His nature is subject to no particular variety. “Why is this? Through his erect shape, through nothing else. – He is formed for humanity;<sup>d</sup> peaceableness, sexual love, sympathy, maternal love, a rung of the humanity of his upright formation – the rule of justice and truth is grounded on the erect form itself of the human being; the latter forms him also for propriety;<sup>e</sup> religion is the highest humanity. The stooped animal senses obscurely; God raised the human being up, so that he, even without knowing and willing it, would scrutinize the causes of things and find thee, thou great connection of all things! Religion, however, produces hope and faith in immortality.”<sup>17</sup> The fifth book discourses on this latter. “From rock to crystals, from these to metals, from these to the creation of plants, from there to the animal, finally to the human being, we saw the form of organization ascend, with it also the forces and drives of the creature become more manifold and finally unite themselves all into the shape of the human being, insofar as this shape could encompass them –.”<sup>18</sup>

8: 50 “Through this series of beings we noted a similarity in the chief form, which approached ever nearer the human shape – just as we also saw the forces and drives approach him. – With each creature, the duration of its life was fixed according to the end of nature that it had to further. – The more organized a creature is, the more its structure is composed from the lower realms. The human being is a compendium of the world: lime, earth, salts, acids, oil and water, forces of vegetation, of stimuli, of sensation are in him organically united. – Through this we come to assume also an *invisible realm of forces*, standing in precisely the same connection and transition, and an ascending series of invisible forces, just as in the visible realm of creation. – This invisible realm does *everything*

<sup>a</sup> *Principium*.

<sup>b</sup> *Vernommenes*, a play on the word *Vernunft* = reason.

<sup>c</sup> *gebildet*.

<sup>d</sup> *zur Humanität gebildet*.

<sup>e</sup> *Woblanständigkeit*.

for the immortality of the soul, and not it alone, but for the continued duration of all effective and living forces of cosmic creation. Force cannot perish, though the instrument can well be disintegrated. What the everliving called into life, that lives; what works, works eternally in its eternal connection."<sup>19</sup> These principles are not unfolded, "because this is not the place for it."<sup>20</sup> Nevertheless, "we see in matter so many forces like spirit that a complete opposition and contradiction of these beings – which are, to be sure, very different – of spirit and of matter, appears, if not self-contradictory then at least entirely unconfirmed."<sup>21</sup> – "Preformed germs no eye has seen. If one speaks of an epigenesis,<sup>22</sup> then one speaks improperly, as though the members accrued *from outside*. It is formation (*genesis*), an effect of *inner forces* for which nature had prepared a mass which they *give their form*,<sup>a</sup> in which they are to make themselves visible. It is not our rational soul that forms the body, but the finger of divinity, organic force."<sup>23</sup> Now we are told this: "1. Force and organ are to be sure most inwardly combined, but are not precisely one and the same. 2. Every force works harmonically with its organ, for it has only formed it and assimilated itself to it for the revelation of its essence. 3. If the hull falls away, then the force remains, which already existed ahead of time before this hull, although in a low condition and just as organically."<sup>24</sup> At which point the author says to the materialists: "Let it be that our soul is originally one with all forces of matter, of stimulus, of movement, of life, and only works at a higher stage, in a more fully formed,<sup>b</sup> more refined organization; has anyone ever seen even one force of movement or of stimulation perish, and are these lower forces one and the same with their organs?"<sup>25</sup> Of their connection we are told that it could be only progress. One can regard humankind as the great flowing together of lower organic forces, which are to germinate in him into the formation of humanity."<sup>26</sup>

That the organization of the human being occurs in a realm of spiritual forces, is shown thus: "[1.]<sup>c</sup> Thought is a thing wholly other than that which sense conveys to the organization of the human being; all experiences concerning its origin are evidences of the effect of an acting being that is to be sure organic, but nevertheless operating by its own power, in accordance with laws of spiritual combination. 2. As the body grows through nourishment, so the spirit does through ideas; indeed, we note with it the same laws of assimilation, growth and production. In short, in us there is formed an inner spiritual human being, who has his own nature and his body only as an instrument. – The clearer consciousness, this great advantage of the human soul, first has been formed only in a spiritual way, through humanity, etc."<sup>27</sup> – in a word, if we rightly understand

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<sup>a</sup> *die sie sich zubilden.*

<sup>b</sup> *ausgebildetern.*

<sup>c</sup> This number seems required by the occurrence of "2." later in the passage.

it, the soul first came to be through spiritual forces gradually added on to one another. – “Our humanity is only a preparatory exercise,<sup>a</sup> the bud of a future flower. Nature step by step discards the ignoble, and on the contrary cultivates the spiritual, refining even further what is refined, and thus we can hope from its artist’s hand that also our bud of humanity will in that existence appear in its proper, true, divine human shape.”<sup>28</sup>

The close is made with this proposition: “The present condition of the human being is probably the connecting<sup>b</sup> middle member of two worlds. – If the human being closes the chain of earthly organizations as its highest and ultimate member, then precisely thereby he also begins the chain of a higher species of creatures as its lowest member, and thus he is probably the middle ring between two interlocking systems of creation. – He exhibits to us two worlds at once, and that makes the apparent duplicity of his essence. – Life is a struggle and the flower of pure immortal humanity is a crown difficult to acquire. – Our brothers of the higher stage therefore certainly love us more than we can seek and love them; for they see our condition more clearly, – and they perhaps educate<sup>c</sup> us to be the participants in their good fortune. – It cannot well be imagined that the future condition should be so entirely incommunicable as the animal in the human being would like to believe, – thus without higher direction, language and the first science seems inexplicable. – Even in later times, the greatest effects on earth arise through inexplicable circumstances, – even sicknesses were often the instruments for them, if the organ became unusable for the common circuit of earthly life; so that it appears natural that the inner restless force perhaps receives impressions of which an undisturbed organization was not capable. – Yet the human being should not spy into his future condition, but should believe himself into it.” (But once he believes that he can spy into it, how can one prevent him from seeking now and then to make use of this faculty?) – “This much is certain, that in every one of his forces there lies an infinity; even the forces of the world whole appear hidden in the soul, and it needs only an organization, or a series of organizations, to be able to set these into activity and exercise, – As the flower stood there and in its *upright shape* closed the realm of the subterranean, still inanimate creation, – so the human being again stands there *upright* over everything that is stooped to the earth (animals). With his sublime gaze and upraised hands he stands there, as the son of the house, awaiting the call of his father.”<sup>29</sup>

#### *Supplement*

The idea and final aim of this first part (one, as it would appear, of a work planned for many volumes) consists in the following. While avoiding all

<sup>a</sup> *Vorübung.*

<sup>b</sup> *verbindende.*

<sup>c</sup> *erziehen.*

metaphysical investigations, the spiritual nature of the human soul, its persistence and progressions in perfection are to be proven from the analogy to natural formations of matter, mainly in its organization. On behalf of this, spiritual forces, to which matter constitutes only the building material, and a certain invisible realm of creation, are assumed, which is to contain the animating force that organizes everything, and indeed in such a way that the schema of the perfection of this organization is supposed to be the human being, to which all earthly creatures, from the lowest stage on, approach until finally, through nothing but this completed organization, whose condition is mainly the upright gait of the animal, the human being came to be, whose death could never end the progress and advancement of the organizations that was previously shown in detail in all kinds of creatures, but rather makes us expect a passage of nature to still more refined operations, so as thereby to promote and elevate him to yet higher stages of life in the future, and so on into infinity. The reviewer must admit that he does not understand this inference from the analogy of nature, even if he were to concede that continuous gradation of its creatures, together with the rule governing it, namely the approximation to the human being. For they are *different* beings that occupy the many stages of the ever more perfect organizations. Thus in accordance with such an analogy only this can be inferred: that *somewhere else*, perhaps on another planet, there might again be creatures who would assert the next higher stage of organization above human beings, but not that *the same individual* will attain to it. With the little flying animals developing out of grubs or caterpillars there is an entirely unique procedure of nature, different from the common arrangement, and yet even there palingenesis<sup>39</sup> does not follow upon *death* but only on the *pupal stage*. What would have to be proven here, on the contrary, is that nature makes animals, even after their decomposition or combustion, ascend from their ashes into a specific more perfect organization, so that by analogy one could infer this also about the human being who is transformed here into ashes. Thus between the elevation of stages of the very same human being to a more perfect organization in another life, and the ladder of stages which one might think among entirely different kinds and individuals of a realm of nature, there is not the least similarity. Here nature lets us see nothing other than that she abandons individuals to complete destruction and preserves only the kind; but there one demands to know whether also the individual in the human being will survive his destruction here on earth, which might be inferred from moral or, if one will, metaphysical grounds, but never from any analogy with that visible generation. But now as pertains to that invisible realm of effective and self-sufficient forces, it is difficult to see why the author, after he has believed he is able safely to infer from the organic generations to its existence, did not

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8: 54 prefer to make the thinking principle in the human being pass immediately to it, as a merely spiritual nature, without raising it up out of chaos through the structure of organization; unless he were to take these spiritual forces to be something wholly other than the human soul and regarded the latter not as a particular substance, but merely as the effect<sup>a</sup> on matter of an invisible universal nature that works within it and animates it – which opinion, however, we have reservations about ascribing to him. Yet what is one to think in general about the hypothesis of invisible forces, effecting organization, hence about the endeavor to want to explain *what one does not comprehend* from *what one comprehends even less*? At least with respect to the former we can become acquainted with its laws through experience, although their causes will remain unknown; but with respect to the latter we are deprived of all experience, and now what can the philosopher adduce here in justification of his allegation, except the mere despair about ever finding the disclosure in any cognition of nature and the decision he is forced into of seeking for it in the fruitful field of his poetic power?<sup>b</sup> Also this is metaphysics, indeed even a very dogmatic one, however much our writer denies it because that is what the fashion wills.

Nevertheless, as to the ladder of the organizations, one may not reproach him too much if it is not sufficient to his aim, that stretches far above this world; for its use in regard to the realms of nature here on earth likewise leads to nothing. The smallness of the distinctions, if one places the species one after another in accordance with their *similarities*, is, given so huge a manifoldness, a necessary consequence of this very manifoldness. Only an *affinity* among them, where either one species would have arisen from the other and all from a single original species or perhaps from a single procreative maternal womb, would lead to *ideas* which, however, are so monstrous that reason recoils before them; but one may not ascribe such things to our author without doing him an injustice. As to his contribution to comparative anatomy through all species of animals down to the plant, those who labor at the description of nature may judge for themselves how far the direction to new observations that he gives here could be of utility to them, and whether that direction has any ground at all. But the unity of the organic force (p. 141),<sup>31</sup> which, as self-forming in regard to the manifoldness of all organic creatures, and later in accordance with the difference of these organs working through them in different ways, is supposed to constitute the entire distinctiveness of its many genera and species – this is an idea that lies entirely outside the field of the observational doctrine of nature and belongs merely to speculative philosophy; but even there, if

<sup>a</sup> *Effekt.*

<sup>b</sup> *Dichtungskraft.*



it were to find reception, it would wreak great devastation among the accepted concepts. Yet to try to determine what organization of the head externally in its figure and inwardly in regard to its brain is necessarily combined with the predisposition to an erect gait, yet even more how an organization directed merely to his end contains the ground of the faculty of reason, in which the animal thereby participates – that obviously surpasses all human reason, whether it wants to grope about on the guiding thread of physiology or fly in the air with those of metaphysics.

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Nevertheless, these considerations<sup>a</sup> should not take all merit from such a thoughtful work as this. One of its excellent merits is (not even thinking about the many reflections that are as beautifully said as they are nobly and truly thought) the courage with which its author has managed to overcome the scruples of his estate, which so often narrow all philosophy in regard to mere attempts of reason as to how far it can get by itself; in this we wish him many followers. Besides this, the mysterious obscurity in which nature itself conceals its business of the organization and the division of its creatures into classes bears a part of the responsibility for the obscurity and uncertainty that attaches to this first part of a philosophical history of humanity,<sup>b</sup> which intended to couple on to one another, if possible, the extreme ends of it, the point from which it started and that where it loses itself in the infinite, out beyond earthly history; which attempt is bold, to be sure, but natural to the drive for inquiry of our reason, and not discreditable<sup>c</sup> even if its execution does not fully succeed. But it is all the more to be wished that in the continuation of the work, in which he will have firm ground under his feet, our spirited author should put his lively genius under some constraint, and that philosophy, whose concern is more with pruning abundant saplings than with making them sprout,<sup>d</sup> should guide him to the completion of his enterprise not through hints but through determinate concepts, not through conjectured<sup>e</sup> but observed laws, not by means of a force of imagination given wings whether through metaphysics or through feelings, but through a reason which is expansive in its design but cautious in the execution.

## II.

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Reminder<sup>f</sup> by the reviewer of Herder's *Ideas* for a Philosophy of the History of Humanity (No. 4 and Supplement of the *General Literary Paper*) on an article directed against this review in the February issue of the *German Mercury*.

<sup>a</sup> *Erinnerungen.*

<sup>b</sup> *Menschengeschichte.*

<sup>c</sup> *unrühmlich.*

<sup>d</sup> *Treiben.*

<sup>e</sup> *gemutmaße.*

<sup>f</sup> *Erinnerungen.*

In the February number of the *German Mercury*, p. 148, there steps forth, under the name of a pastor, a defender of the book of Mr. Herder against the alleged attack on it in our *General Literary Paper*. It would be unfair to involve the name of a respected author in the dispute between reviewer and counter-reviewer; hence here we want to defend only our way of proceeding in publicizing and judging the said work as conforming to the maxims of diligence, impartiality, and moderation which this paper has adopted as its standard. In his article, the pastor quarrels much with a metaphysician whom he has in mind, and who, as he imagines him, is wholly spoiled for all instruction through the paths of experience, or where they do not complete the matter, for inferences in accordance with the analogy of nature, and who wants everything to fit his last of fruitless scholastic abstractions. The reviewer can well tolerate this quarrel, since in this he is fully of one opinion with the pastor, and the review itself is the best proof of that. But since he believes himself rather well acquainted with the materials for an anthropology, and likewise somewhat with the method of their use in attempting a history of humanity<sup>a</sup> in the whole of its vocation, he is convinced that these materials may be sought neither in metaphysics nor in the cabinet of natural history specimens by comparing the skeleton of the human being with that of other species of animals; least of all, however, does the latter lead to his vocation for another world; but that vocation can be found solely in his *actions*, which reveal his character; he is also persuaded that Mr. Herder did not even have the aim in the first part of his work (which contains only the presentation of the human being as an animal in the universal system of nature, and thus a prodromus of future ideas) of providing the actual materials for the history of the human being, but only thoughts to which he wanted to make physiologists more attentive; their researches are commonly directed only to the mechanical aim of animal structure, but he wants to extend them further if possible, and as far as the organization appropriate<sup>b</sup> for the use of reason in this creature; nevertheless, he has put more weight on these thoughts in this regard than they could ever bear. It is also not necessary for him who is of the latter opinion, as the pastor demands on p. 161, to prove that human reason might ever be *possible* with *another form* of organization, for into this there can be no more insight than into how it might be possible in the present form *alone*. The rational use of experience also has its boundaries. It can teach us, to be sure, that something is so-and-so, but never that it *could* not at all *be otherwise*; neither can any analogy fill this immeasurable gap between the contingent and the necessary. In the review it was said: "The smallness of the distinctions, if one places the species one after another

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<sup>a</sup> *Menschheit.*<sup>b</sup> *zweckmäßigen.*

in accordance with their *similarities*, is, given so huge a manifoldness, a necessary consequence of this very manifoldness. Only an *affinity* among them, where either one species would have arisen from the other and all from a single original species or perhaps from a single procreative maternal womb, would lead to *ideas* which, however, are so monstrous that reason recoils before them; but one may not ascribe such things to our author without doing him an injustice.”<sup>32</sup> These words seduced the pastor into believing that in the review of the work he had encountered *metaphysical orthodoxy*, hence *intolerance*; and he adds: “*Healthy reason left to its own freedom recoils from no idea.*”<sup>33</sup> But there is nothing to fear of all that he fathoms. It is merely the *horror vacui*<sup>a</sup> of universal human reason, namely, to *recoil* where one runs up against an idea in which *nothing at all can be thought*, and in this regard the ontological codex might well serve as a canon for the theological, and indeed precisely for the sake of tolerance. The pastor finds besides the merit of *freedom in thinking* ascribed to the book much too common for so famous an author. Without doubt he is of the opinion that *external* freedom is being talked about, which, because it depends on place and time, is in fact no merit at all. Yet the review had before its eyes that *inner* freedom, namely the freedom from the chains of concepts and ways of thinking that are habitual and confirmed by general opinion; – a freedom that is *not at all* common, so that even those who confess loyalty only to philosophy have only rarely been able to work themselves all the way up to it. What he complains about in the review: “*that the passages it picks out are those expressing the results, but not at the same time those that prepare for them,*”<sup>34</sup> this may well be an unavoidable ill for authorship as a whole, which after all is easier to bear than picking out only one or another passage in order to pronounce general praise<sup>b</sup> or condemnation on it. So let's stick with the judgment on the work in question, given with all due respect and even with sympathy for the author's *fame*, still more his *future fame*, which judgment therefore sounds quite different from that which the pastor (not very conscientiously) imputes to it on p. 161, “*that the book did not accomplish what its title promised.*” For the title did not at all promise, already in the first volume, which contains only general physiological preliminaries, to accomplish what is expected of the following ones (which, as far as one can judge, will contain the anthropology proper); and the reminder was not superfluous in that it limits the freedom in the latter, while it might have deserved indulgence in the former. Besides, it now depends only on the author himself to accomplish what the title promised, which one has cause to hope from his talents and his learning.

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<sup>a</sup> horror of a vacuum.

<sup>b</sup> rühmen.

## III.

Riga and Leipzig: Hartknoch. *Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity*<sup>a</sup> by Johann Gottfried Herder. Second Part, 344 pp. Octavo, 1785.

This part, which continues up to the tenth book, describes first, in six sections of the sixth book, the organization of peoples in the region of the north pole and around the Asiatic ridge of the earth, the zone of the finely formed nations<sup>b</sup> and of the African nations,<sup>c</sup> the human beings on the islands of the torrid zone and the Americans.<sup>d</sup> The author closes his description with the wish for a collection of new portrayals of nations,<sup>e</sup> for which Niebuhr, Parkinson, Cook, Höst, Georgi, and others have already provided the beginnings.<sup>35</sup> “It would be a fine gift if someone capable would collect the faithful paintings, scattered here and there, of the differences of our kind,<sup>f</sup> and with them *laid* the ground for *an explicit natural doctrine and physiognomy of humanity*.<sup>g</sup> Art could hardly be applied more philosophically, and an anthropological chart, like the zoological one that *Zimmermann*<sup>36</sup> has attempted, on which nothing must be indicated except what is diverse in humanity,<sup>b</sup> but this also in all appearances and respects, such a thing would crown the philanthropic work.”<sup>37</sup>

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The seventh book considers first the propositions that despite such different forms, humankind is nevertheless everywhere only one species and that this one kind has acclimatized itself everywhere on the earth. Next, light is shed on the effects of climate on the formation of the human being in body and soul. The author acutely remarks that many preliminaries are still lacking before we can come to a physiological-pathological climatology, much less a climatology of all the human powers of thinking and sensing, and that it is impossible from the chaos of causes and consequences which here comprise the height and depths of a given zone of the earth, its constitution and its products, foods and drinks, ways of life, labors, clothing, even the customary pastimes, pleasures and arts, together with other circumstances, to order a world in which every thing, ever single region is given its due, and receives neither too much nor too little. With commendable modesty he therefore mentions the general remarks following p. 99 only as problems (p. 92).<sup>38</sup> They are contained under the following chief propositions: 1. Through all kinds

<sup>a</sup> *Menschheit*.

<sup>b</sup> *schön gebildeter Völker*, which apparently refers to the Europeans and to North Americans of European descent.

<sup>c</sup> *Nationen*.

<sup>d</sup> *That is, the native Americans*.

<sup>e</sup> *Nationen*.

<sup>f</sup> *Verschiedenheit unsers Geschlechts*.

<sup>g</sup> *Menschheit*.

<sup>b</sup> *Menschheit*.

of causes a climatic community is furthered, which belongs to the life of living things. 2. The habitable land of our earth is concentrated into regions where most living beings operate in the form most satisfactory to them; this situation of the parts of the world has an influence on all their climates. 3. Through the structuring of the earth by mountain ranges, not only was the climate altered incalculably for the great variety of living things, but also the dispersal of humankind was prevented, as much as it can be prevented. In the fourth section of this book the author asserts that the genetic force is the mother of all formations on the earth to which the climate only contributes favorably or unfavorably, and closes with a few remarks about *the strife between genesis and climate*, where he among other things also *expresses the wish for a physical-geographic history of the descent and variation<sup>a</sup> of our kind in accordance with climates and ages.*

In the *eighth* book, Mr. H. pursues the use of human senses, the power of the imagination of the human being, his practical understanding, his drives and happiness, and elucidates the influence of the traditions, of opinions, of usage and habit, through examples from different nations.<sup>b</sup>

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The *ninth* concerns itself with the dependency of the human being on others in the development of his capacities, with language as means for the formation of human beings, with the invention of the arts and sciences through imitation, reason and language, with the governments as established orders among human beings, mostly from inherited traditions; and closes with remarks about religion and the oldest tradition.

The *tenth* contains for the most part the result of thoughts the author has already expounded elsewhere; since aside from the observations about the first habitat of the human being and the Asiatic traditions about the creation of the earth and humankind, it repeats the most essential thing of the hypothesis about the Mosaic creation story from his work *The Oldest Document of Humankind.*

This dry catalogue of this part too is supposed to be only an announcement of the content, not an exhibition of the spirit of this work; it is supposed to invite you to read it, not replace the reading of it or make that unnecessary.

The sixth and seventh books contain almost entirely only extracts from ethnographic descriptions; of course sought out with skilled choice, arranged masterfully and everywhere accompanied by the author's own astute judgments; but, a detailed extract from them is all the less possible for that reason. It is also not our intention here to pick out or analyze many a fine passage, full of poetic eloquence, which will offer itself with advantage to every sensitive reader. But just as little do we want

<sup>a</sup> *Verartung.*

<sup>b</sup> *Nationen.*

to investigate here whether the poetical spirit that animates his expression has not sometimes also invaded the author's philosophy; whether here and there synonyms have not been allowed to count as explanations and allegories for truths; whether instead of there being neighboring passages from the domain of philosophical language into the precinct of poetical language, the boundaries and proper dominions of both have not been completely displaced; and whether in many places the fabric of bold metaphors, poetic images, mythological allusions, have not served rather to conceal the body of the thoughts as under a *farthingale* than to let it shine forth agreeably as through a transparent vestment. We will leave it to critics of the fine art of philosophical writing, or to the final hand of the author himself, e.g. to investigate whether it would not be better to say: "not only day and night and change of seasons alter the climate" than, as on p. 99: "*Not only day and night and the rondelay of modulating seasons alter the climate*";<sup>39</sup> whether the following image, doubtless beautiful in a dithyrambic ode, is well fitted to a natural history description of these alterations on p. 100: "Around the throne of Jupiter its (the earth's) *horae*<sup>40</sup> dance a rondelay, and although what is formed under their feet is to be sure only an imperfect perfection, because everything is built on the unification of things of different kinds, but through an inner love and conjugal union with each other, still the child of nature is born, sensible regularity and beauty";<sup>41</sup> or whether the transition turning from the traveller's remarks about the organization of different nations<sup>a</sup> and about the climate to a collection of commonplaces based on them, with which the eighth book starts, is not too *epic*: "As one who from a voyage on the waves of the sea is supposed to take a voyage into the air, so with me, after the formations and natural forces of humanity,<sup>b</sup> I now venture to get to its spirit and dare to investigate its alterable qualities on our broad earthly sphere on the basis of the defective and in part uncertain records of others."<sup>42</sup> We shall also not investigate whether the stream of his eloquence does not here and there involve him in contradictions, whether, e.g., when it is cited on p. 248 that discoverers often had to leave the utility of their discoveries more to posterity than discovering it for themselves, this does not provide a new example to confirm the proposition that the natural predispositions of the human being, which relate to the use of his reason, were meant to be completely developed only in the species and not in the individual – which proposition, however, along with certain propositions flowing from it (which, however, he does not grasp entirely correctly), he is inclined to censure on p. 206 as close to an *insult against the majesty of nature* (which others, in prose,

<sup>a</sup> *Völker.*

<sup>b</sup> *Menschheit.*

call blasphemy against God);<sup>43</sup> all this, thinking of the limits that are set on us, we must here leave untouched.

But there is one thing that the reviewer would have wished, as much as to our author and to everyone else who undertakes as a philosopher a universal natural history of the human being: namely that a historical-critical mind had done all the preliminaries for them, picking out from the immeasurable multiplicity of ethnographic descriptions or travel narratives and all their conjectural records belonging to human nature, especially those in which they contradict one another, placing them next to one another (yet also with added reminders on the credibility of each narrator); for then no one would so rashly base himself on one-sided accounts, without first having weighed them precisely against the records of others. But now from a multiplicity of descriptions of countries one can prove, if one wants to, that Americans, Tibetans, and other genuine Mongolian peoples have no beard, but also, if it suits you better, that all of them are by nature bearded and only pluck them out; that Americans and Negroes are each a race,<sup>a</sup> sunk beneath the remaining members of the human species in their mental predispositions,<sup>b</sup> but on the other side by just as apparent records that as regards their natural predispositions, they are to be estimated equal to every other inhabitant of the world; so it remains to the choice of the philosopher whether he wants to assume differences of nature or wants to judge everything in accordance with the principle *tout comme chez nous*,<sup>c</sup> so that all his systems he erected on so shaky a foundation must take on the look of rickety hypotheses. The division of the human species into *races*<sup>d</sup> is not favored by our author, primarily not that grounded on inherited colors, presumably because the concept of a race<sup>e</sup> is for him not distinctly enough determined. In the seventh book, third number, he calls the cause of the climatic difference of human beings a *genetic* force. The reviewer has the following concept of the meaning of this expression, in the author's mind. He wants to dismiss on the one side the system of evolution<sup>44</sup> and yet also on the other side the mere mechanical influences of external causes as providing unworkable grounds of elucidation, and he assumes as its cause a principle of life, which appropriately modifies *itself* internally in accordance with differences of the external circumstances; with this the reviewer fully concurs, only with this reservation, that if the cause organizing itself *from within* were limited by its nature only perhaps to a certain number and degree of differences in the formation of a creature (so that after the institution of which it were not further free to form yet another type

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<sup>a</sup> Race.

<sup>b</sup> *Geistesanlagen*.

<sup>c</sup> Everything is as it is with us.

<sup>d</sup> *Racen*.

<sup>e</sup> Race.

8: 63 under altered circumstances), then one could call this natural vocation<sup>a</sup> of the forming nature also “germs” or “original predispositions,” without thereby regarding the former as primordially implanted machines and buds that unfold themselves only when occasioned (as in the system of evolution), but merely as limitations, not further explicable, of a self-forming faculty, which latter we can just as little explain or make comprehensible.

With the *eighth book* a new course of thought begins, which proceeds until the conclusion of this part and contains the origin of the formation<sup>b</sup> of the human being as a rational and moral creature, hence the beginning of all culture; according to the author’s mind, this is not to be sought in the human species’ own faculty, but rather entirely outside it, in a teaching and instruction by other natures; starting from there, all progress in culture is supposed to be nothing but a further communication and contingent proliferation<sup>c</sup> of an original tradition; it is to the latter and not to himself that the human being has to ascribe all his approximation to wisdom. The reviewer, when he sets foot outside nature and reason’s path of cognition, does not know how to proceed any longer, since he is not versed in the learned study of languages and the knowledge and judgment of ancient documents, and hence does not understand at all how to make use philosophically of the facts narrated and thereby also preserved in them; hence he admits that he can have no judgment here. Nevertheless, from the author’s extensive learning and his special gift of grasping disparate data under one viewpoint, it may be conjectured in advance that we will get many beautiful things to read at least about the course of things human, insofar as it can serve to acquaint us further with the character of the species and where possible even with certain classificatory differences within it, which can also be instructive for those who might be of a different opinion about the first beginning of all human culture. The author expresses briefly the foundation of his opinions (pp. 338–9, with the note) thus: “This (Mosaic) didactic story<sup>d</sup> narrates that the first created human beings had dealings with the instructing Elohim, that under their guidance, through acquaintance with the animals, they acquired language and dominating reason, and that since the human being wanted to be like them in a forbidden way, in the knowledge<sup>e</sup> of evil, he attained to this to his detriment and from now on took up another place, beginning a new, artificial way of life. If, therefore, the Deity willed that the human being should practice reason and foresight,

<sup>a</sup> *Naturbestimmung*.

<sup>b</sup> formative education = *Bildung*.

<sup>c</sup> *Wuchern*.

<sup>d</sup> (*mosaische*) *lebrende Geschichte*.

<sup>e</sup> *Erkenntnis*.



it itself had to look after him<sup>a</sup> with reason and foresight. – But now how did the Elohim look after the human beings, i.e. teach, warn and instruct them? If it is not just as bold to ask about this as to answer, then the tradition itself will provide the disclosure to us in another place.”<sup>45</sup>

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In an untrodden desert, a thinker, like a traveller, must remain free to choose his own path as he thinks best; one must wait to find out how successful he is and whether, after he has reached his goal, he will in due time find his way safely home again, i.e. to the seat of reason, and hence can count on having followers. For this reason the reviewer has nothing to say about the pathway of thought on which the author has entered, however, he believes himself to be justified in taking under his protection some of the propositions contested by the author along this pathway, because this freedom to choose his own road for himself must be admitted to him. Namely, he says this on p. 260: “It would be an *easy*, but *evil* principle<sup>b</sup> for human history to say ‘The human being is an animal who has need of a master<sup>46</sup> and expects from this master, or from their connection, the good fortune of his final vocation.’”<sup>47</sup> “Easy” it may well be, just because it is confirmed by the experience of all times and in all peoples, but why “evil”? On p. 205 it is said: “Providence thought beneficently when it gave preference to the easier happiness of individual human beings over the artificial final ends of large societies and as far as possible saved those precious state machines for later time.”<sup>48</sup> Quite right, but first the happiness of an animal, then of a child, then of a youth, and finally that of a man. In all epochs of humanity,<sup>d</sup> just as in all estates at any one time, a kind of happiness is found which is suited precisely to the concepts and the habits of the creature as to the circumstances into which it is born and grows up; indeed, as regards this point, it is not even possible to indicate a comparison in terms of the degree of happiness and a preference between one class of human beings or of one generation over the others. But what if the genuine end of providence were not this shadowy image of happiness, which each makes for himself, but rather the always proceeding and growing activity and culture that is put in play by it, whose greatest possible degree is only the product of a state constitution ordered in accordance with concepts of human right, and consequently something that can be a work of human beings themselves? Thus, in accordance with p. 206: “Every individual human being would have in himself the measure of his own happiness,”<sup>49</sup> without coming second to any following members in its enjoyment; but as to the worth not of their condition, once they exist, but to their existence itself, i.e. why they are really there, it is here

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<sup>a</sup> *sich seiner . . . annehmen.*

<sup>b</sup> *Grundsatz.*

<sup>c</sup> *Endbestimmung.*

<sup>d</sup> *Menschheit.*

alone that a wise intention on the whole is revealed. Does the author really mean that if the happy inhabitants of Tahiti, never visited by more cultured nations,<sup>a</sup> had been destined to live for thousands of centuries in their tranquil indolence, one could give a satisfying answer to the question why they exist at all, and whether it would not have been just as good to have this island populated with happy sheep and cattle as with human beings who are happy merely enjoying themselves? That principle is therefore not as *evil* as the author thinks. – Even though it might have been an *evil man* who said it. – A second proposition to be taken under protection is this. On p. 212 it says: “If someone said that not the individual human being but humankind is to be educated,<sup>b</sup> then he speaks unintelligibly for me, since kind and species are only general concepts, except only insofar as they exist in individual beings. – It is as if I spoke of animality, minerality and metality in general and adorned them with the most splendid attributes, which, however, contradict one another in single individuals! – On this path of Averroistic philosophy our philosophy of history shall not wander.”<sup>50</sup> Obviously whoever says “No individual horse has horns but the species of horses is horned” would utter a flat absurdity. For “species” then signifies nothing but the mark in which all individuals must agree with one another. But if “the human species” signifies the *whole* of a series of generations going (indeterminably) into the infinite (as this meaning is entirely customary), and it is assumed that this series ceaselessly approximates the line of its destiny<sup>c</sup> running alongside it, then it is not to utter a contradiction to say that in all its parts it is asymptotic to this line and yet on the whole that it will coincide with it, in other words, that no member of all the generations of humankind, but only the species will fully reach its destiny. The mathematician can give elucidation here; the philosopher would say: “The destiny of humankind is on the whole a *ceaseless progress*, and its completion is a mere idea, but very useful in all respects – the idea of a goal to which we have to direct our endeavors in accordance with the aim of providence.” Yet this error in the cited polemical passage is only a trifle. More important is its conclusion: “On this pathway of Averroistic philosophy (so he says) let our philosophy of history not wander.” Let it be concluded from this that our author, to whom everything that has been given out previously as philosophy has often been so displeasing, will now provide to the world, not in an unfruitful nominal definition, but through deed and example in this extensive work, a model of the genuine way of philosophizing.

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<sup>a</sup> *gesittetern Nationen.*

<sup>b</sup> *erzogen.*

<sup>c</sup> *Bestimmung*; this word will be translated as “destiny” several times more in the rest of this paragraph.

steady low-grade rainfall) and similar symptoms in country animals, especially horses and dogs. In conclusion, Fothergill asks country doctors to report the time of year during which the disease occurred in their vicinity and to indicate any differences in symptoms and treatment from the ones he described.

*Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim*

- 1 The passage referred to is the following, whose author was Kant's colleague and follower Johann Schultz: "A favorite idea of Professor Kant is that the final end of humankind is the attainment of the most perfect political constitution, and he wishes that a philosophical historiographer would undertake to provide us in this respect with a history of humanity, and to show how far humanity has approached this final end in different ages, or how far removed it has been from it, and what is still to be done for its attainment" (AA 8: 468).
- 2 "Il n'est rien si dissociable et sociable que l'homme: l'un par son vice, l'autre par sa nature." Michel Eyquem de Montaigne, "De la solitude," *Essais*, ed. André Tournon. Paris: Imprimerie nationale Éditions, 1998, 1: 388. "There is nothing more unsociable than Man, and nothing more sociable: unsociable by his vice, sociable by his nature," "Of Solitude," *The Complete Essays*, tr. M. A. Screech. London: Penguin Books, 1991, p. 267.
- 3 The "Amphictyony" (from "amphictions" = dwellers around) was an ancient Greek association, active between the sixth and fourth centuries BC and formed originally for the protection of certain religious shrines (most prominently, the oracle of Apollo at Delphi). The league met twice annually at Delphi and Thermopylae, and carried on three successful wars in the name of religion between 600 and 346. It did also aim at establishing peace among Greek states, but the last of its so-called "sacred wars," in 339–338, was merely a pretext for Philip to establish Macedonian hegemony over the other Greek states.
- 4 See Hume, "Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations," *Essays Moral, Political and Literary*, ed. Green and Grose. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1875, 1: 414.

Review of J. G. Herder's *Ideas for the philosophy of the history of humanity*

- 1 Herder's *Ideas* will be cited from the original edition, which Kant used, whenever Kant cites such pages, but then also, in an endnote, from *Herders sämtliche Werke*, ed. B. Suphan, Berlin: Weidmann, 1881–1913 by volume: page. Where Kant provides no citation, only the latter edition will be cited, in an endnote, as "Herder," followed by volume: page. It must be kept in mind, however, that Kant's quotations are frequently inexact, or even inaccurate, and he often cobbles together quotations gleaned from several pages, separating them one from another with dashes.
- 2 Herder, 13: 19.
- 3 Herder, 13: 19–20.
- 4 Cf. Herder, 13: 22–3. Kant's quotations here are often mere paraphrases. In the passage from which Kant quotes here, Herder does not speak of any

- “dissolutions and revolutions” of one creature into another through which human beings came about.
- 5 Herder, 13: 25.
- 6 Cf. Herder, 13: 29. This last (somewhat enigmatic) phrase is Kant’s invention, and is not found in Herder.
- 7 This is again a loose summary, based on Herder, 13: 33–46.
- 8 Again, this is a patchwork summary, taken from Herder, 13: 65–70.
- 9 Herder, 13: 71.
- 10 Herder, 13: 78.
- 11 Herder, 13: 112–13.
- 12 Herder, 13: 114.
- 13 Herder, 13: 117.
- 14 Herder, 13: 129–45, again a loose patchwork of quotations.
- 15 Herder, 13: 146.
- 16 Herder, 13: 151.
- 17 Cf. Herder, 13: 151–64.
- 18 Herder, 13: 167.
- 19 Cf. Herder, 13: 167–70.
- 20 Herder, 13: 170.
- 21 Herder, 13: 172.
- 22 “Epigenesis” is the theory that each individual living thing grows from a separate germ or seed, arising from one of its parents or their union; it is contrasted with the theory of “preformation,” according to which the living thing exists wholly in one of these prior to their union. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 167, and *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, AA 5: 412–24. Herder is claiming a continuity of all organic forces on the ground that no germ can be either ultimately preformed or properly speaking the result of epigenesis.
- 23 Cf. Herder, 13: 172–4.
- 24 Herder, 13: 174.
- 25 Herder, 13: 176.
- 26 Cf. Herder, 13: 180–1.
- 27 Cf. Herder, 13: 182–5.
- 28 Herder, 13: 192.
- 29 Herder, 13: 199–201.
- 30 “Palingenesis” refers to any sort of transmigration of the soul from one bodily form to another. It was sometimes used to refer to metamorphosis (as in the case of insects or amphibians), but also to refer to the doctrine of “metempsychosis,” reincarnation or transmigration of souls. Cf. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 683/B 711; Leibniz, *Monadology* §§ 72–4; and Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* §704.
- 31 Herder, 13: 102.
- 32 See above, AA 8: 54. The wording and emphasis are slightly different in this occurrence of the quoted passage. Cf. *Teutscher Merkur* (February, 1785), p. 164.
- 33 Cf. *Teutscher Merkur* (February, 1785), p. 165.
- 34 Cf. *Teutscher Merkur* (February, 1785), p. 166.

- 35 Carsten Niebuhr (1728–1815), Sydney Parkinson (1745?–71), James Cook (1728–79), Georg Hjersting Høst (1734–94) and Johann Gottlieb Georgi (1738–1802) were eighteenth-century travellers and explorers.
- 36 Eberhard August Wilhelm von Zimmermann (1743–1815).
- 37 Herder, 13: 251.
- 38 Cf. Herder, 13: 265–7.
- 39 Herder, 13: 270.
- 40 The “horae” in Greek mythology were the seasons, daughters of Zeus and the Titaness Themis, who summons the gods to their banquets (and is also by some accounts supposed to be the mother of Prometheus); the horae were generally numbered three rather than four (spring, summer, and winter), and were thought to be attendants on the gods at their assemblies.
- 41 Herder, 13: 270.
- 42 Herder, 13: 290.
- 43 Herder, 13: 342; the proposition Herder is inclined to censure as blasphemous is, of course, the Second Proposition of Kant’s *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (AA 8: 18).
- 44 “Evolution” in Kant’s day was another name for the system of “preformation,” which is contrasted with the system of “epigenesis,” favored by both Kant and Herder. See above, note 22.
- 45 Herder, 13: 435.
- 46 This “easy but evil proposition” is of course Kant’s own proposition in *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (AA 8: 23).
- 47 Herder 13: 383.
- 48 Herder, 13: 341.
- 49 Herder, 13: 342.
- 50 Herder, 13: 345–6. Ibn Rushd (Latin transliteration: “Averroes”) (1126–1198) was an influential Islamic philosopher and commentator on Aristotle active in Moorish Spain. His Aristotle commentaries arrived in Western Europe in the early thirteenth century, about the same time as the *libri naturales* of Aristotle (the *Metaphysics*, *Physics*, and other works on natural science). Herder does not explain what makes Kant’s view “Averroistic.” Herder may have had in mind Averroes’s interpretation of the “passive intellect” in Aristotle, which involved a religiously heterodox belief in collective (but not individual) immortality. This view made Averroes an object of persecution by his fellow Muslims, and was also a source of resistance in Christian Europe to Averroes’s version of Aristotelianism. Kant’s view that there are collective natural ends in history which are not the ends of individuals may have seemed to Herder a denial of the dignity of individuals which is comparable to that involved in Averroes’s denial of individual immortality. But the sudden, creative thirteenth-century reception of Aristotle in the West, fateful to all philosophy and science since then, would have been unthinkable without Averroes’s brilliant commentaries on the *libri naturales*. Averroes is therefore one of the greatest enlighteners in the history of philosophy.

*Introduction to Determination of the concept of a human race*

- 1 Due to the politically sensitive nature of the central topic of these essays and also due to Kant's repeated regrettable conflation of descriptive and analytic statements with evaluative and even pejorative judgments about different ethnic groups to be found in them, Kant's theory of the natural history of the human species has not found the sustained scholarly attention it deserves in terms of its philosophical content and its contributions to the history and philosophy of science. A notable recent exception to this practice is Raphaël Lagier, *Les races humaines selon Kant*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004. For a discussion of Kant's theory in the context of modern biology, see Annette Barkhaus, "Kants Konstruktion des Begriffs der Rasse und seine Hierarchisierung der Rassen," in *Biologisches Zentralblatt* 113 (1994), 197–203.

*Determination of the concept of a human race*

- 1 Abbé Demanet, former French missionary in the Senegal, who had travelled extensively in that part of Africa and who after his return to France published *Nouvelle histoire de l'Afrique enrichie de cartes et d'observations astronomiques et géographiques* (New History of Africa Enriched With Astronomical and Geographical Maps and Observations), a German translation of which appeared under the title, *Neue Geschichte des französischen Afrika* in 1778. The reference in question is to be found in vol. 1, Preface, pp. 18ff. and vol. II, pp. 155ff. of the German translation.
- 2 Philip Carteret (1733–96), British rear admiral and geographical explorer, who discovered several South Sea islands on his voyage around the world in 1766–9. His travel account appeared in German translation under the title, *Captain Carteret's Fahrt um die Welt von 1766–69* (Captain Carteret's Voyage Around the World from 1766–9), in *Historischer Bericht von den sämtlichen, durch Engländer geschehenen Reisen um die Welt*. Translated from English, 3 vols., Leipzig 1776 (Historical Report of All Voyages Around the World Undertaken by Englishmen). The citation from Carteret in the following sentence of Kant's text, however, is not to be found in that translation. Moreover, on p. 67 of the translation, Carteret attributes to the inhabitants of Free Will Island a copper rather than a yellow skin color. This had been pointed out to Kant by his critic, Georg Forster in an essay entitled '*Noch etwas über die Menschenrassen*' (Something Further on the Human Races). For Kant's response, see Kant's essay *On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy*, contained in the present volume (especially AA 8: 177).
- 3 Peter Simon Pallas (1741–1811), German physician and investigator of nature, who, as a member of the Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg, undertook extensive travels into the Asian parts of the Russian empire (1768–74) and the Crimea (1793–4). Author of *Reisen durch verschiedene Provinzen des Russischen Reiches in den Jahren 1768–74* (Voyages Through Various Provinces of the Russian Empire in the Years 1768–74), 3 vols., 1771–6. Part 1 of his *Sammlung historischer Nachrichten über die mongolischen Völkerschaften* (Collection of Historical News About the Mongolian Peoples) appeared in St. Petersburg in 1776.